[ NNSquad ] Re: AT&T Asks FCC to, Kill Conventional (POTS) Phone Service]

[Ben Kamen <bkamen@benjammin.net>]

> Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2009 16:27:25 -0500
> From: Joe Baptista
> =================================================
> POTS is more secure then IP. Getting rid of POTS puts the government of the
> United States in a very vulnerable position with respect to national
> security. POTS is the only reliable service for national emergencies.

Er, I don't know if I would say "secure".

I have some T1/T3 equipment on my shelf here that if I could get access would easily let me listen to phone calls.

Now, you can say VoIP is just as tappable.. and it is.. provided you have access. So those things are kinda
equal.

Both you can scramble/encrypt. I would guess computers can do an easier job on VoIP than
one might do with *analog* voice..

 -Ben

p.s. I also have a linemans set on my shelf. Just give me some wires
and I can pierce right in and use.  I love POTS. :D

  [ Well, there's a reason that linemen's test sets are colloquially known
    as "Butt Sets" or "Butt-Ins" ... I have several myself of interesting
    vintages and origins ... 

    BUT (no pun intended) there are lots of issues.  I think it's
    fair to suggest that un-or-poorly encrypted VoIP/SIP connections
    can be much easier technically to wiretap "en masse" than circuit
    switched analog or digital POTS calls.  An even more interesting
    question though, relates to the legal status of various types of
    VoIP calls.  Given projects like Phorm, and Virgin's new Internet
    "looking at the packets' contents to see what P2P music you're
    collecting" project, and the general laxness and conflicting
    rulings regarding Internet privacy, the concept of all phone
    calls (potentially) finding themselves under the Internet
    umbrella has enormous legal and privacy implications.

    And of course data is easy and cheap to archive these days.  Some
    back of the napkin calculations I did a few years ago suggested
    that (assuming access to the data streams) it would not
    necessarily be impractical for a well-connected entity to archive
    the complete audio of a very significant percentage of all
    telephone calls made in the U.S.  If you made a deal with ISPs and
    backbones handling significant amounts of VoIP traffic, this would
    be even easier.  Just copy the bits and file them away in the server
    farms.  Given the traditional NSA attitude that (in simple terms) you
    haven't really intercepted calls until you actually listen to them
    (as opposed to just collecting and storing for future retrospective
    listening as necessary later), the implications are interesting.

    Of course, you don't need VoIP to do this.  Modern phone systems
    connect most calls digitally, even with analog access lines.  But
    I believe that unencrypted (or weakly encrypted) VoIP could make
    such massive call collection activities significantly easier in 
    many situations.
 
    Naturally, this is just end of year "could it be done?"
    speculation, not a suggestion that such mass wiretapping is
    actually occurring now, related to the folks out on Savage
    Road or their other agency counterparts either in the U.S.
    or foreign countries ...

       Kropotkin (Russian Agent): Are you trying to tell me every
	phone in the country is tapped?
        ---
       Don Masters (CEA [sic] Agent): That's what's in my head.
        ---
       Kropotkin: Don, this is America, not Russia! 

	     >>> The President's Analyst (1967) <<<


      -- Lauren Weinstein
         NNSquad Moderator ]


--
Ben Kamen - O.D.T., S.P.
=============================================================================
Email: bkamen AT benjammin DOT net              Web: http://www.benjammin.net