NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad
[ NNSquad ] As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption
As Feds Demand the Keys, Preparing for the Death of Public-Key Encryption
http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/001062.html
With further confirmation of the longstanding rumor that the U.S.
government (and, we can safely assume, other governments around the
world) have been pressuring major Internet firms to provide their
"master" SSL keys for government surveillance purposes, we are rapidly
approaching a critical technological crossroad. ( http://j.mp/19il4s9 [CNET] )
It is now abundantly clear -- as many of us have suspected all
along -- that governments and surveillance agencies of all stripes --
Western, Eastern, democratic, and authoritarian, will pour essentially
unlimited funds into efforts to monitor Internet communications.
This goes far beyond the targeted wiretaps of yesteryear. It is now a
fundamental doctrine of surveillance religion -- bolstered by
anti-terrorism hysteria and opportunism -- that it is the purview of
government to capture and store virtually all communications, for both
real-time and ideally retrospective analysis on demand.
The rather Orwellian mindset of these agencies and their minions is
clear -- they don't even consider such vacuuming of data to be
eavesdropping until a particular target is in focus for actual,
detailed inspection.
And they especially don't like having to go "hat in hand" to Internet
services asking for specific data, since many of these services have
the annoying (to the spooks) habit of pushing back against overly
broad data requests.
So it should come as no surprise that intelligence efforts in this
sphere have become ever more focused on compromising the underlying
encryption frameworks, permitting potentially comprehensive access to
data via Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) and other techniques directly
from high traffic interconnecting communications channels themselves.
Whether or not such behavior can be justified from valid national
security, public safety, or other grounds -- vs. the damage done to
civil rights in the process -- is a policy and political question, not
a technical one per se.
But as technologists, I believe that we now -- more than ever -- must
start coming to grips with an unpleasant truth.
Public-key cryptography as we know it today may be rapidly approaching
the end of its useful lifespan.
The red flags have been popping up all over.
We've seen serious compromises of encryption certificates and
certificate issuing authorities, increasing concerns about the
security of widely used cipher algorithms, and a range of other
associated exploits.
But even then, it's all too easy not to see the forest for the trees.
We quickly lapse into arguments about RC4 and AES, Perfect Forward
Secrecy, active vs. passive attack models, and a virtual cornucopia of
other crypto slang to gladden our geeky hearts no end.
Yet just as we now know that the essentials of public-key (asymmetric)
crypto were secretly developed by the UK's GCHQ several years before
the publication of Diffie and Hellman's work, it is prudent to at
least assume that intelligence agencies around the globe may still be
working several steps ahead of public "state of the art" in crypto
tech -- including the means to subvert widely used mechanisms.
This seems especially true given the apparently massive and bloated
influx of funding and other resources being provided these agencies
for ostensible anti-terror and "cyberwar" projects of enormous (and
mostly secret) scopes.
To be sure, there are many balls in the air. For example, we don't
really know the extent to which governments may have forced the hands
of chip manufacturers to include "special goodies" for surveillance
purposes. It's easy to dismiss such ideas as unlikely -- but given
recent events, discounting them entirely would seem problematic.
Similarly, we know that when governments really want to target
someone, they'll find some way to compromise the associated computers
directly -- either through phishing or other malware attacks, or via
in-person "black bag" jobs to physically alter systems as they might
feel appropriate.
So specific targets -- justified or not -- probably don't have much of
a chance.
Still, as technologists concerned about the fundamental security of
the Internet against massive, untargeted data collection -- if only to
help protect our data from illicit attacks if nothing else -- I
believe it would be fully appropriate for us to be considering
alternative methodologies for data protection that are sufficiently
outside the existing public-key "box" to provide citizens and
consumers alike a higher degree of confidence that their legitimate
and appropriate communications will be free from unwarranted and
unreasonable interceptions by any players, foreign or domestic.
To be clear, this is not to assert that targeted, justified intercepts
should not be possible under appropriate and realistic court
supervision.
However, massive, unfocused, prospective data collection by agencies
around the world is much harder to justify, and vastly more subject to
potential abuse.
The individual paths at this crypto crossroad may not be clearly
marked. But the route we choose to take may be among the most
important decisions not only of our lives, but for generations to
come.
--Lauren--
Lauren Weinstein (lauren@vortex.com): http://www.vortex.com/lauren
Co-Founder: People For Internet Responsibility: http://www.pfir.org/pfir-info
Founder:
- Network Neutrality Squad: http://www.nnsquad.org
- PRIVACY Forum: http://www.vortex.com/privacy-info
Member: ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy
Lauren's Blog: http://lauren.vortex.com
Google+: http://google.com/+LaurenWeinstein
Twitter: http://twitter.com/laurenweinstein
Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800 / Skype: vortex.com
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