NNSquad - Network Neutrality Squad
[ NNSquad ] Wikileaks and Provenance
----- Forwarded message from David Farber <dave@farber.net> -----
Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2010 17:45:11 -0500
From: David Farber <dave@farber.net>
Subject: [IP] Wikileaks and Provenance
Reply-To: dave@farber.net
To: ip <ip@listbox.com>
Begin forwarded message:
From: Ross Stapleton-Gray <ross@stapleton-gray.com>
Date: December 9, 2010 5:16:42 PM EST
To: dave@farber.net
Subject: Wikileaks and Provenance
Dave, for IP if you like...
As a former intelligence officer, I'm struck by a delicious irony in the situation we now find ourselves in with Wikileaks:
Cables have been published by Wikileaks, apparently classified U.S. State Department reporting; the U.S. government hasn't commented on their authenticity, either to admit or deny, though it's a fair guess that Assange is publishing what *he* believes to be authentic. To peel another layer of that onion, he's presumably made some effort to understand his own source(s), but they may or may not be telling the truth.
We're now in a phase, though, where the U.S. government and others are trying to suppress Wikileaks' publication; the Net being the Net ("censorship... route around it...") there are various mirror sites, etc.
And, in theory, we could see claims of publication of cables that were never viewable on Wikileaks (especially as Assange is in custody, so things may shift to alternate sources).
And let's say we do... should we believe that they're actually a product of Wikileaks' actions? From the same source(s), with the same degree of authentication that was performed on Assange's previous source(s)?
Really, there's a lot of "we don't know," or, worse, "we don't know what we don't know," with respect to authentication of documents and provenance. Certainly the previous Wikileaks dumps have taught anyone who wants to learn what a classified State Department cable might look like.
And so, a new concern... fakes. Fakes intended to produce reaction--in financial markets, in commerce more broadly, in politics, etc.--and fairly easily passed off as authentic in the current environment of "no comment" and source suppression.
So, as a simple scenario... rather than spam the world with notes from ostensible Nigerian princes, what if someone put out a smattering of cables, each addressing aspects of this story:
- The Danish government has evidence that it has partially interdicted efforts by Al Qaeda to target pipelines, refineries and other fuel transport systems in the North Sea;
- The UK government has alerted the Norwegian government that concerns over potential terror threats in the North Sea may require it to station Royal Navy ships in Norwegian waters;
- Norway has concerns that environmental groups may pressure the government if news of heightened risk of seaborne oil spills gets out;
- The UK government is weighing an operational moratorium on oil pumping operations within 10 nautical miles of the North Sea coast;
etc., etc.
This, of course, after buying a lot of calls on the spot market for North Sea petroleum. Or, better (to avoid attracting any attention), with a little research, speculating in second-order areas that would rise or fall if the story were to be believed and acted on.
So, we're in the odd position that we're at risk of victimization by criminal fraud that only intelligence agency verification of provenance could really solve. But I very much doubt that they would do that, even if it were only, "Apart from all the other cables on which we'll make no comment, these several about the North Sea are someone's scam." And even if they did, would they actually be believed?
So, welcome to the Internet Age! :-)
Ross
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Ross Stapleton-Gray, Ph.D.
Stapleton-Gray & Associates, Inc.
http://www.stapleton-gray.com
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