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[ NNSquad ] Re: "How to Patrol Your ISP"


This overlaps with another goal of mine -- a standard wireless<=>bridge (AKA, an access point but I don't like that biased term) with both a closed face for the local bubble baby network while providing an open face for amenity access. It can also be a way to be proactive on NN assurance.

 

For this purpose of this discussion I see such a router as an opportunity to add measurement capabilities -- both probing and responding. I'm interested in what router code may already have these capabilities or, perhaps better, what a metering platform would be like since you don't really want to hard code it.

 

The added value would be more than just reporting in NN issues -- it could be a start towards taking responsibility to network integrity from the edge if such routers were widely adopted.

 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: nnsquad-bounces+bob19-0501=bobf.frankston.com@nnsquad.org [mailto:nnsquad-bounces+bob19-0501=bobf.frankston.com@nnsquad.org] On Behalf Of Richard Clayton
Sent: Sunday, November 18, 2007 14:04
To: nnsquad@nnsquad.org
Subject: [ NNSquad ] Re: "How to Patrol Your ISP"

 

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In message <7144C7E7-5D66-4F99-BA0C-D729BA8BBF1C@neiltiffin.com>, Neil

Tiffin <neilt@neiltiffin.com> writes

 

>Wireshark on both ends may be a little complicated for beginners to 

>utilize for nnsquad efforts. 

 

My credentials first :)  I've worked on these issues, and have published

papers on the Great Firewall of China and on BT's "CleanFeed" that

attempts to block child pornography, plus LAN spoofing issues in my PhD

thesis....

 

... and most things are too complicated! and that's even when you think

you understand how TCP/IP works (which will certainly be a step too far

for most of the people who try to patrol their ISP), you'll discover

some little oddments that you'd forgotten or was invented too recently

for anyone except real experts to know about..

 

So as soon as you move beyond "can I contact the other end", you need

some very careful experiments to work out what's going on.

 

I noted people earlier mentioning (tcp)traceroute, ping & such. The

results from these are almost meaningless unless you have a really good

grasp of the network design in your neighbourhood :(

 

It's also amazing how many people don't understand it isn't a router's

job to return ICMP Echo Response packets (or receive UDP from you), and

that a lack of them doesn't mean it is turned off, or that

www.microsoft.com is dead because it never responds; or indeed that

Solaris ratelimits responses and so you tend to get *'s in the middle of

otherwise interesting values.

 

Designs like CleanFeed send different packets via different routes (and

there are other related designs at the BGP level). Once you know that

you can check for the effect, but naive testing would entirely miss it.

 

        http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf

 

>It seems to me that some sort of 

>standardized, specific to nnsquad, measurement server(s) should be 

>set up to control variables at one end of the connection. 

 

I think you need to move beyond that to a standardized tool at the

testing end as well -- each module of which is designed to detect one

specific type of interference.

 

Otherwise you're going to have a whole heap of false reports from NATs,

local firewalls, or just service outages, along with loads of traces

that no-one can be bothered to sort through the minutiae of (if indeed

they aren't too private to look at).

 

>This would 

>make the measurements somewhat more reliable and consistent.  Of 

>course, this could be gamed by a smart ISP, but this would be 

>interesting to know also.

 

It won't so much be a smart ISP, as a smart appliance manufacturer :)

but I expect that it will be inability to make a test look exactly like

what the appliance is trying to block that will generate inaccurate

results, rather than "enemy action".

 

- --

Richard Clayton                          <richard.clayton @ cl.cam.ac.uk>

                    Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, CB3 0FD

 

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